Abstract -
INTRODUCTION

S
tates rely heavily on the federal income tax regime; however, they also refl ect their own preferences, for example, by legislating deviations from federal taxable income. These differences in taxing systems have created a compliance and administrative burden that is exacerbated by the mobility of modern businesses and individuals and by the growth in businesses that operate across many state lines. Taxpayers have to deal with both state and federal tax systems, and the burden is even greater for multi-jurisdictional businesses as they deal with several states' tax regimes. Furthermore, economic ineffi ciencies can arise when changes in the federal law affect states (e.g., vertical externalities) or when changes in one jurisdiction have consequences on others (e.g., horizontal externalities).
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The simplest way to deal with the complexity and ineffi ciencies is to work towards a harmonized tax system, but political and practical problems with abandoning our federalist system make that diffi cult and unlikely. 2 An alternative is for the federal and state governments to cooperate in a way that maintains the essential desirable elements of tax autonomy but minimizes the compliance problems and economic distortions. Little research has been done on the appropriate level of cooperative interaction between federal and state governments in setting tax policy, but improvements to the current state of affairs are possible. For example, economic savings may be achieved on the compliance side, particularly with more uniformity (Fox and Swain, forthcoming) , and technology improvements open up a vast array of possibilities for cooperative tax administration efforts.
The federal government has extensive interactions with state governments and provides various types of direct and indirect assistance across a wide spectrum of tax-related activities. For purposes of this paper, these interactions can be broadly characterized in three categories-fiscal assistance, de facto cooperation, and active cooperation. We begin with a description of the goals of effective federal and state cooperation, followed by a description of existing and planned cooperative efforts in each of the broad categories of federal/state interactions, 3 discuss some promising ongoing and planned efforts, and conclude with an evaluation of the existing state of affairs and where we might go from here.
GOALS OF A FEDERAL/STATE COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP
An ideal cooperative relationship should strive for the following goals: provide a policy framework for decision making, preserve tax autonomy at all levels of government, seek economies of scale, minimize compliance and administrative costs, and identify and promote mutually benefi cial cooperative efforts. The starting point to improving the current system is to develop an effective framework for making tax policy decisions. At a minimum, the federal government should consider the impact of any federal tax changes on the entire tax system. Changes made at the federal level are particularly important as most states use the federal tax base as their own starting point. The federal government should quantify the impact of proposed legislation on state revenues and consider alternatives when the impact is expected to be signifi cant. For issues that affect the effi ciency of the tax system as a whole, the federal government should determine under what circumstances intervention in state tax matters should take place (promote horizontal equity, prevent tax planning abuses, etc.). Furthermore, states should also consider how their tax policies could affect other states-for example by directing taxable activity to domestic "tax havens" or by facilitating other types of tax competition.
Important benefi ts exist for allowing states to independently levy taxes, limited only by constitutional restrictions. Therefore, steps towards a more cooperative relationship, including more uniformity, should not sacrifi ce the essential desirable elements of autonomy regarding the tax base and rates. Independent tax autonomy allows for decentralized government operations and can result in greater effi ciency gains for service delivery. Furthermore, subnational governments are often better equipped to respond to their citizens' demands.
State and federal governments should work together to streamline the tax assessment and collection process. The ease of transmitting information around the world opens up possibilities of developing economies of scale and minimizing compliance and administration costs. Data collection and sorting requires a signifi cant up-front investment, but once collected, the data can be shared among all interested parties quickly and accurately. Several data-sharing initiatives are ongoing, but opportunities exist for new programs.
The federal and state governments can differ on taxable bases and tax rates; however, governments at all levels share common interests in identifying non-fi lers, uncovering illegal tax evasion schemes, streamlining the audit process, and collecting taxes owed. Identifying these and other common interests where working together can be mutually beneficial to all parties is a key underlying goal of intergovernmental cooperation. Plans are already under way to increase joint electronic fi ling efforts and to streamline the audit and collection processes.
CATEGORIES OF FEDERAL/STATE INTERACTIONS
Fiscal Assistance
The federal government provides an indirect fi nancial subsidy to the states by allowing a federal deduction for state and local taxes paid. This fi scal assistance effectively subsidizes about one-third of the state taxes paid by taxpayers in the highest federal brackets. For businesses, almost all state and local taxes are deductible by businesses as taxes or as a cost of acquiring business inputs. Currently at the individual level, income, property, and sales taxes are deductible at the federal level, but only for taxpayers that are able to itemize.
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The deduction/subsidy is an important benefi t to subnational governments, but not without a cost. Federal tax deductibility reduces the amount of income redistribution because it decreases the progressivity of the federal income tax system. 5 Itemizers effectively pay only a portion of their state tax, with the portion decreasing as the taxpayer's marginal rate increases. Therefore, the deduction helps high-income itemizers but provides little or no assistance to taxpayers in the lowest brackets or individuals who do not itemize.
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The deduction also potentially creates behavioral responses. First, if deductibility does not apply uniformly to all state and local taxes, governments will have an incentive to fi nance public goods and services with taxes that are deductible and have a lower real cost to state and local taxpayers.
7 For example, elimination of the deductibility of state and local sales taxes with the Tax Reform Act of 1986 8 may have given state and local governments an incentive to raise revenues from the still-deductible income and property taxes and decrease their relative reliance on the sales and use tax. The actual experience did not follow predictions as the sales tax continued to grow (Fox, 1998) . Second, prior research shows that federal deductibility of state and local taxes increases the size of state and local governments because the deduction subsidizes the net cost of fi nancing additional state and local spending (Gramlich, 1985) . The federal policy makers should consider whether favoring some taxes over others and/or subsidizing local governments is a desirable side effect of the federal tax deduction. Feldstein and Metcalf (1987) suggest that the deduction may stimulate 4 Currently individuals can deduct the greater of state and local sales/use taxes or state and local income taxes.
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See Stark (2004) , who argues that the deduction for state and local taxes impedes a central tenet of fi scal federalism.
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Of course, taxpayers subject to the Alternative Minimum Tax receive no benefi t from deductibility (see Reuben (2005) ).
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For example, see Holtz-Eakin and Rosen (1990) , who show that the deductibility of property taxes leads to a higher proportion of property taxes in local budgets.
8
There have been a number of proposals to eliminate or limit the deductibility of state and local taxes for federal income tax purposes.
additional spending by governments with artifi cially low levels of public services and may be more cost effective than federal grants.
De Facto Cooperation-The Common Tax Base
In the U.S., the de facto adoption by most states of the federal income tax base is a key element of the federal/state policy framework. (Hildreth et al., 2005) .
The essential agreement on most taxbase issues allows states to rely on federal codes, regulations, cases and rulings to resolve questions of law or interpretation. Relief from the heavy lifting of legislating and interpreting the detail necessary for a modern tax on income leaves state and local tax authorities free to focus on other matters. Even those states that have a starting point other than federal taxable income utilize the federal statutory scheme to resolve important questions of law. Joint audits and cooperation between audit departments, shared professional education, bilateral data exchange, and cooperation on tax shelter reporting are all possible because the fundamentals of taxing income rely on the same basic starting point.
To illustrate how this agreed-upon starting point simplifi es tax compliance and administration, consider a simple matter such as wages, reported on W-2 forms to millions of workers every year. Wages include cash payments but exclude an array of employer-provided benefi ts such as health and life insurance, working condition fringe benefi ts, educational benefi ts, and employers' contributions to the various payroll and unemployment taxes. In fact, dozens of codes on the back of recent W-2s explain exactly what is included or excluded from the line "wages."
States that adopt the federal wage definition greatly simplify taxpayer compliance efforts since preparers of W-2 forms only need to calculate wages under one defi nition. If states independently determine what constitutes "wages," each of the millions of employers has to be familiar with and account for state differences for each state in which the employer has employees. Federal and state differences also introduce the possibility of inadvertent errors on the part of taxpayers who must fi rst become aware of the differences and then keep track of year to year changes across perhaps many states. Administration is simplifi ed since state auditors can use the results of a federal adjustment to the wages line without performing their own calculations of the amount of under/overstatement. With a uniform wage defi nition, the state adjustment will be the same as the federal adjustment.
The presumption is that coordination of the federal and state taxable base minimizes compliance and administration costs. Studies of individual income tax and business income tax compliance costs have been done, 9 but none attempts 9 See Slemrod and Sorum (1984) and Blumenthal and Slemrod (1992) for studies on federal individual income tax compliance. See Slemrod and Blumenthal (1996) and Mills, Erickson, and Maydew (1998) for studies on federal corporate income tax compliance.
to estimate the cost savings of federal and state coordination. Prior research, however, fi nds that disconformity between states increases state tax compliance burdens and that greater uniformity could generate substantial compliance cost savings (Gupta and Mills, 2003; Hildreth et al., 2005) .
Policy Challenges of Conformity
The states' dependence on the federal base introduces tension between levels of government, particularly when changes in the federal tax law occur. Tax policy decisions at the federal level most often ignore potential impacts on state revenues.
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States have the option of accepting the federal changes and the impact on their own budgets or decoupling from the federal provision and, therefore, increasing complexity. For example, the federal response to the recession in the early 2000s was to reduce tax on many business activities and provide major investment incentives, largely funded with a federal budget defi cit. Because states require a balanced budget, and the federal changes were estimated to cost states as much as $14.7 billion over three years (Dennen, Nakamura, Hogroian, and Weinreb, 2002) , many states chose to decouple from the most generous federal changes, such as bonus depreciation and IRC Section 179 asset expensing. Furthermore, when states need additional revenues, they may fi nd it politically easier to decouple from selected federal provisions (rather than increasing marginal rates) without considering the increase in complexity and, therefore, increased administration and compliance costs.
The estate tax at the federal and state level is informative, both as an example of a perfectly conforming state tax and how federal action can have dramatic but perhaps unintended impacts on state revenues. Prior to the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA), the federal estate tax allowed taxpayers a credit (subject to limits) for state death taxes paid. States had no desire to tackle diffi cult estate tax audits for the relatively small incremental revenue 11 and 38 states simply assessed a "pick-up" tax equal to the maximum allowed federal credit. This approach vastly simplifi ed the estate tax compliance and administrative burdens as taxpayers essentially had a single return to complete (Form 706), which determined both the federal and state death tax owed. State auditors relied almost entirely on the federal return and audit results and were tasked only to ensure that the proper amount was actually remitted to the state. Taxpayers were indifferent to the state estate "pick-up" tax since any amount not paid to the state would reduce the federal credit allowed and increase the amount, dollar for dollar, due to the federal government. Effectively, this arrangement was equivalent to a national estate tax and a federally determined grant to the states.
This simple and effective situation changed dramatically with EGTRRA. The Act phased out the credit over time and replaced it with a simple deduction. This change literally gutted the estate tax system of the "pick-up" states because when the maximum federal credit allowed for state taxes paid went to zero, so did the state estate tax for the 38 states with a pick-up tax. Some states passed legislation establishing a new estate tax, often based on what the credit was at some point in prior law, but most have not legislated a replacement estate tax.
Furthermore, the federal change signifi cantly increased the compliance and administration burdens for taxpayers and state governments. Since the state death tax is now in addition to the federal tax (whereas before it was an offsetting credit) taxpayers have, for the fi rst time in many states, an incentive not to fi le a state return. State auditors now must fi rst ensure that each estate properly fi les a return and must audit the return, at a minimum for mathematical accuracy, and to account for differences between the federal and state exemption equivalents. For taxpayers and tax professionals, the estate tax regimes that replaced the "pick-up" tax vary from state to state, with different exemption amounts and rates. In addition to fi ling a separate state tax return, tax and estate planning strategies that assumed a uniform state and federal death tax are no longer valid and must include provisions that allow for different strategies and post-death actions on the part of executors depending on the particular state estate tax in effect at death. Taxpayers also have, for the fi rst time, an incentive to locate in states with lower estate taxes, or to plan their estates to take advantage of state rate differences.
The policy challenge facing federal and state governments is to allow for the desirable differences in the tax rate and tax base, but in a manner that minimizes the compliance burdens and economic distortions. The "pick-up" estate tax may have been popular because the state revenues raised by the tax were minor and legislative tinkering would unacceptably increase the compliance and administrative burden without an offsetting benefi cial impact on state revenues or other policy goals. With corporate income taxes only comprising approximately ten percent of state revenues, weighing disadvantages of decoupling from federal rules with the benefi ts would likely reveal a greater preference for conformity than currently exists. States should reserve decoupling for the most signifi cant items that are critical to accomplishing their economic development goals.
Active Cooperation
Federal-State Exchange of Information
Despite the many signifi cant hurdles presented by tax-regime differences, states and the federal government have found a number of areas where cooperation is possible and increasingly effi cient. The cornerstone of cooperative tax administration in the United States is an active exchange of information between federal and state tax authorities to support enforcement of the personal and corporate income tax. The recent increases in information exchange (discussed below) are likely due to several factors. First, the visibility of tax-planning abuses, particularly by large corporations, makes enforcement strategies more politically important. Second, advances in technology make information sharing easier and more cost effective. State and local revenue departments constantly face limited resources, and the political climate and competition for business has made raising tax rates or implementing new taxes more diffi cult. Finally, continually changing business practices have also contributed to the increase in information sharing. As businesses develop more complicated structures, tax administrators are forced to specialize in certain areas and certain industries.
Federal law authorizes the IRS to provide federal tax return information to state tax agencies, provided it is used solely for tax administration purposes and is properly safeguarded against unauthorized disclosure or release.
12 All states have entered into an exchange of information agreement with the IRS through which they routinely receive an abundance of tax information. Information exchanged includes copies of all federal audits or other adjustments to a taxpayer's return, identifi cation of taxpayers fi ling a federal income tax return with an address in the receiving state, extracts of items of income and expense reported on the federal tax return, information reports fi led by third-party payers (e.g., banks, brokerage fi rms, and employers) with respect to taxpayers in a particular state, address and location information for taxpayers, and information on possible taxpayer assets available for levy. Given the basic level of conformity between state and federal income tax bases (see earlier discussion), this information is often used to assess additional state tax directly. For example, one of the most effective information exchanges is an IRS program that matches third-party reports of income to entries on taxpayer returns. The IRS assesses additional federal tax where income has been omitted and provides information on the adjustment to the state tax authority in which the taxpayer resides. The state customarily issues an automated assessment of additional state tax, unless the income is exempted by the state. States also compare the exchanged data with state files to insure consistency in amounts reported to federal and state tax authorities and to identify potentially non-fi ling taxpayers. With the massive amounts of information involved, all information is exchanged on computer-readable or electronic media instead of paper. States and the IRS are now in the process of migrating the means of delivering the information from a physical transportation to secure electronic delivery.
Federal data and federal audit reports are the predominant means of independently auditing state individual income tax returns in many states. The rates of state individual income taxes (generally fi ve to eight percent of taxable income) are such that it is not cost-effective (particularly compared to the yield on audits of state corporate income taxes and retail sales taxes) to maintain a substantial cadre of state revenue agents to conduct on-site audits of individual income tax returns.
States also use the results of federal corporate tax audits for enforcement. Since the computation of state tax generally begins with federal taxable income, states rely extensively on federal examination activities for verifi cation of the tax base and the proper treatment of various transactions, particularly those involving international operations. State agencies devote their audit activities primarily to verifying the apportionment of income across states, examining the taxpayer's treatment of certain types of transactions, and determining the membership of the unitary group if the state employs combined reporting. The sharing of information on multistate corporations is not as seamless as many believe it should be. Current interpretations of federal law require that states must make a special request for information on a corporation that is not headquartered in the state. The information is available to the requesting state, presuming it can provide a valid tax administration reason as to why it needs the information.
States have recently gained access to data from other federal agencies to aid in tax enforcement activities. They receive regular reports from the U.S. Customs Service on imported goods, which they use to identify goods to which the retail sales and use tax may apply or to identify potential taxpayers who may not be registered.
Historically, the fl ow of information was largely from the federal government to the states. In recent years, however, states have begun providing more information to federal tax administrators, and the IRS has begun more systematically using the information it receives. In particular, federal administrators use state lists of registered sales taxpayers to identify potential non-fi lers of federal employment and corporation taxes and to cross-check reported receipts. They also periodically use fi les maintained by other state agencies that license individuals engaged in various trades and professions as a source of leads (e.g., on non-fi lers). Finally, state driver license fi les provide a good source of address information and potential assets in a seizure situation. Here again, the data are exchanged under legal agreements regarding the use and safeguarding of the data, and most information is exchanged in computer-useable form.
Two relatively nascent efforts that are primarily of benefi t to the IRS are also worthy of mention because they indicate how the IRS is beginning to make more systematic use of the state data. The fi rst is a program called the State Reverse File Match Initiative (SRFMI-pronounced Surf Me), where states will be extracting various items of return information from their individual income tax files and providing them to the IRS who will match them against the IRS Master File. The effort is two-fold: (1) Identify people who may have fi led at the state level but not at the federal level; and (2) Compare certain items of income and expense that are reported on the state return to those entries on the federal return. Once institutionalized at the IRS and state levels, this can be a cost-effective match program. IRS has identifi ed the information they want and the format they want it in. It will take some work by states to participate, but all have expressed a willingness to do so as long as they can fold implementation into their regular work plans.
The second "new" effort is the "State RAR (Revenue Agent Report) Program." Here, the states are doing what the IRS has done for some time, i.e., sending information on adjustments made during a state audit to the IRS so it can follow up with any appropriate federal adjustments. Once again, the IRS is fi nalizing the information it wants and the format in which it wants it. The program is being piloted and an implementation plan is being developed.
The tax shelter area is an excellent example of where exchanging information between the IRS and states can and has improved compliance at both levels. Through some extraordinary efforts at the state and federal levels, a regular, two-way fl ow of information between states and the IRS was developed on who was participating in shelters, the types of shelters, who was coming forward in the Voluntary Compliance Inititatives (VCIs), who the promoters were, and the like. This enabled both the IRS and the states to leverage their resources and achieve better coverage than they could have individually. Forty-eight states, the City of New York, and the District of Columbia entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the IRS to exchange information on shelter participants and promoters, and states and the IRS regularly exchanged information on adjustments made during tax shelter audits. According to the IRS, the Abusive Tax Avoidance Transaction (ATAT) partnership resulted in the sharing of over 28,000 leads between the states and the federal government, leading to the discovery of tens of millions of dollars in previously unknown fraudulent tax avoidance schemes. In one "infamous" case, one state was able to provide IRS with information necessary to make a $6 million assessment just hours before the federal statute of limitations would have run out because of the active program of information exchange.
About 40 states also signed MoUs among themselves to share information on tax shelter promoters and participants. States have developed a data base of information on promoters and participants in various tax shelters. The data base contains identifying information on the participants and promoters so that users of the data base can then examine their fi les for information on the taxpayer and the returns that have been fi led. The IRS is considering participation in the data base, but there are some disclosure issues that need to be addressed.
Another initiative in the data exchange area is that states and the IRS are now exploring the possibility of establishing a "relationships data base" that would enable users to identify the ownership/ income relationships among various levels of pass-through entities. The intent would be to enable an auditor or agent to inquire against the data base and identify the various types and levels of passthrough entities in which an individual or corporation or other pass-through entity may be involved. The data base would be built using information already gathered by the IRS, maintained by the IRS, and governed by IRS disclosure and safeguard standards.
There are relatively few instances in which the states and federal government conduct joint audits of individual taxpayers. An exception is in the motor fuel excise tax area in cases where earlier investigative work by either the federal or state tax authority has revealed evidence of criminal tax evasion.
There is little in the way of cooperative efforts between state and federal agencies in the administration of excise taxes on alcoholic beverages or tobacco products, except for occasional working arrangements between individual agencies at the local level.
13 Federal law, however, does require that manufacturers of tobacco products and alcoholic beverages provide reports to state tax authorities on all products shipped to wholesalers in the state. This is a great aid in insuring that tax is paid on all products entering the distribution chain in a particular state.
There has been increasing cooperation between the federal government and states in the collection of delinquent tax obligations. Delinquent taxpayers may often owe money to both state and federal authorities. In fact, this is often a source of friction between tax authorities, with one level attempting to assert priority over the other where there are insuffi cient resources to satisfy both obligations. 14 However, the two sides have agreed to cooperate when the taxpayer is due a refund from one jurisdiction but has unpaid obligations to another.
Since 2000, states have been participating in the federal Tax Refund Offset Program where a certifi ed delinquent state income tax debt is offset against a federal tax refund. This produces about $200 million per year for the states. The program is limited, however, to resident taxpayers. States are seeking federal legislation to expand the program to nonresident taxpayers. Likewise, the IRS participates in state offset programs through the State Income Tax Levy Program (SITLP) in something over half of the states, and this produces upwards of $100 million per year for the IRS. The IRS may levy income tax refunds by matching federal delinquent accounts against a database of states participating in the SITLP. 15 13 In the past, there was more cooperation between state and federal offi cials. More recently, the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms has been preoccupied with the activities of paramilitary militias and anti-terrorism activities. 14 Federal law regarding collection of delinquent taxes complicates efforts to share or jointly conduct collection activities. For example, federal statutes prohibit entities other than the IRS from collecting federal delinquencies. They also prevent the IRS from sharing any proceeds it might collect until all federal tax debts are satisfi ed. Legislation that would ease this process is under consideration. In one cooperative venture, about 30 states will withhold (i.e., levy and attach) a state income tax refund to satisfy a federal tax delinquency. 15 The SITLP only applies to state individual income tax refunds but may include business tax refunds in the future.
State participation is just now beginning to pick up after the program was suspended to bring it into compliance with the revised delinquency procedures of the IRS Restructuring Act of 1998. In addition, three states are now piloting a program with the federal government in which the federal tax debt fi les are matched to all vendor payments made by states in order to recover tax delinquencies. Presuming success, this sort of program could pay some substantial benefi ts to closing the federal tax gap. If successful, the federal government should consider offsetting other types of federal payments for state tax debts.
Cooperative Taxpayer Assistance
Beyond the audit and enforcement efforts, state and federal tax authorities have undertaken a wide range of cooperative taxpayer service and education activities. Of particular note are cooperative or joint programs for providing training and education to tax practitioners and preparers as well as providing cooperative registration and fi ling assistance to new businesses. It is also not uncommon for state and federal authorities to offer onsite taxpayer assistance at a single site.
The most ambitious effort has been in the area of cooperative or coordinated electronic filing. Each of the 42 states (including D.C.) with an individual income tax has a program for electronic fi ling of the returns. All but four of these states participate in the FedState E-fi le program in which the taxpayer (using a participating tax preparer or approved third-party software) may fi le his/her federal and state tax return in a single electronic transmission. 16 The return is transmitted to the IRS, which performs limited validity checks and then makes the state return information available for download by the states. 17 This close program coordination facilitates the use of common formats, data defi nitions, etc., all of which eases any burden of electronic fi ling on taxpayers and tax preparers and promotes participation in electronic fi ling. Electronic fi ling is generally seen as improving tax compliance by eliminating mathematical and data-entry errors and improving overall service to taxpayers. In 2006, about 54 percent of all state income tax returns were fi led electronically, the vast majority through the cooperative FedState program.
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Cooperative electronic filing efforts are also being extended to areas beyond the individual income tax. As the IRS has moved into electronic fi ling of corporation income and other types of returns, states have worked closely with the Service to fashion counterpart state-level programs. In 2007, about one-half of the states will implement electronic fi ling programs for the corporate income tax. Nearly all of them will be "FedState programs" that will operate like the individual tax program with the returns being fi led using common formats, defi nitions, protocols, etc. with the IRS and then being made available to the states. Likewise, a number of states will be developing similar programs for the electronic fi ling of partnership returns over the next few years.
The IRS and states have entered into some other, more minor, cooperative programs to take advantage of online convenience. As of this writing, two states (Georgia and New York) will take online applications for business registrations and 16 California, Maine, Massachusetts, and Minnesota accept electronic returns directly. 17 Beyond the point at which the electronic return is received by the state tax agency, administration proceeds separately, with each level responsible for any further contact it might have with the taxpayer. A federal law enacted in 1976 authorized the federal government to administer state income taxes for states that agreed to adopt the federal income tax base (among other conditions). No state has availed itself of this opportunity, and the provision was repealed in 1992 as an unused and unnecessary piece of federal law. 18 FTA calculation based on information provided by the states.
transmit that information to the IRS. The IRS will use that information to immediately issue an employee identifi cation number (EIN), and will follow up with the traditional letter confi rming the federal EIN in about two weeks. The hope is that this one-stop paperless application will be convenient to both taxpayers and tax administrators.
According to the IRS, several other programs are in development or in the initial operational stages. Under the Fed/State Offshore Payment Card Matching Initiative, the IRS is expanding the use of state databases to identify and locate taxpayers who have participated in offshore credit-card abuse. The Title 31 Money Servicing Businesses Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) is a federal-state information exchange program targeted at increasing compliance by money services. The initiative includes personnel from the IRS, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), and state regulatory agencies.
Collaborative Training Efforts
A fi nal area of collaboration between state and federal tax authorities is in training personnel. This cooperation takes three forms: First, state tax agency personnel are able to take part in all IRS-sponsored training sessions if space is available. This includes access to a wide range of courses from short-term, specialized courses to more basic courses, which might be several weeks in length (e.g., basic criminal investigation). This enables states to leverage the resources of the IRS to meet certain training needs for which it would be impractical to develop their own offerings.
Second, state and federal tax authorities have on occasion jointly developed specialized training programs. Most recently, they cooperated in developing basic and advanced courses in motor fuel audit and investigation; over 1,200 state and federal agents attended the course over the last three years.
Finally, IRS personnel regularly participate, both as instructors and students, in training sessions conducted by state agencies or their representatives. For example, the Federation of Tax Administrators (FTA) 19 regularly sponsors training workshops and conferences on current topics and techniques in tax administration for state agency personnel. IRS personnel regularly participate in such events.
Procedures for Cooperation
The process by which these cooperative tax administration activities are initiated, developed, and implemented is diverse and somewhat dependent on the nature of the initiative. Outside the information and data exchange area, the cooperative efforts are generated largely by individual state tax authorities and their counterpart IRS district offi ce. Representatives from the IRS and state tax agency regularly meet to examine ways to cooperate, and it is out of such liaisons that many individual initiatives grow. Once developed and tested, they are likely to be replicated in other states. But the implementation of many efforts may not occur in all areas of the country.
There is a similar coordinative mechanism at the national level for efforts affecting all states. The leadership of the FTA, as representatives of state tax authorities, holds regular liaison sessions with the executive leadership of the IRS to discuss and coordinate cooperative activities. The IRS maintains a small National Offi ce staff (about 15 persons) dedicated to assisting states in working with the IRS and in providing information on the types of cooperative activities being conducted across the country. Numerous IRS staff throughout the country and in various functions devote at least part-time to working with states. Leadership and staff of the IRS and FTA play a lead role in designing and implementing efforts that are nation-wide in implementation, e.g., the joint electronic fi ling program and the information exchange program. They are also active in facilitating the adoption of initiatives generated at the state-district level to other regions of the country.
PROMISING CURRENT INITIATIVES
The discussion above highlights a number of good examples of the federal and state governments working together, particularly in the areas of information sharing and taxpayer assistance. Many of theses initiatives simplify and improve compliance with routine requirements and are mutually benefi cial to both the federal and state taxing authorities. Although those programs are very helpful to the governments administering taxes, there has been little reduction in overall taxpayer compliance costs and no true economies of scale. For example, the cost-savings benefi ts from coordinated electronic filing should be substantial as paperless returns become the norm, but the overall taxpayer burden of dealing with multiple taxing jurisdictions is relatively unaffected by such measures. The programs discussed below could potentially have a real benefi cial impact on the overall complexity of the U.S. tax system.
The Streamlined Sales Tax Project
The states have long recognized that the sales tax base is eroding due to increases in remote commerce and sales not subject to sales/use tax in any state. The Streamlined Sales Tax Project (SSTP) was created to reverse the decline and to prod Congress to change the law to reverse the base erosion. The project itself seeks to simplify and modernize the collection and administration of sales and use taxes, and it is a current example of where cooperation between federal and state governments could have a signifi cant impact on tax collections and tax effi ciency. Its key features include rate simplifi cation, uniform defi nitions of sourcing rules and audit procedures, uniform defi nitions of key categories such as "food" and "drugs," and state-level administration of taxes and funding of the system.
Vendors without nexus are not required to collect and remit sales and use taxes on remote sales. The current sales and use tax landscape includes thousands of taxing jurisdiction with dozens of different defi nitions of sales taxable items and hundreds of different rates. Without very advanced software and streamlined reporting and tax remittance procedures, the compliance burden for small and large businesses alike would be overwhelming and cost prohibitive. The hope is that simpler and more effi cient administrative procedures would reduce the compliance burden on businesses, and businesses would voluntarily comply with the sales and use tax systems of participating states.
When the SSTP was fi rst formed in 2000, most businesses and policy makers were skeptical that states could ever agree on a comprehensive simplifi cation package and pass conforming legislation. The long-run goal of the SSTP is to convince Congress to give states the authority to collect sales and use taxes from remote vendors. Several bills have been introduced in Congress to get its consent to the SSUTA. 21 In June 2006, the Streamline Sales Tax Simplifi cation Act (S.2153) authorized member states of the SSUTA to require remote sellers to collect and remit the sales and use taxes on sales to the member states. All bills have been rejected primarily due to concern for small businesses, Internet businesses, and impacts on local governments. There is also signifi cant concern that the costs to implement the rules will outweigh the increase in revenues.
Federal legislation to adopt the SSUTA would have many advantages. First, the legislation would shift the compliance burden from consumers (who are obligated under current law to pay use taxes) to sellers and, therefore, reduce the number of taxpayers. It would also simplify the compliance burden for businesses currently complying with the sales and use tax system. 22 This in turn would reduce the administrative and audit burden on states and businesses. In addition, proposed legislation would signifi cantly reduce complexity in dealing with multiple jurisdictions in the 50 states. Finally, the legislation would also close a growing loophole that encourages tax avoidance. Adoption of the SSUTA would collect taxes equally from all retailers, reducing the inequity between Internet firms and brick-and-mortar fi rms.
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Probably the biggest disadvantage of the SSUTA is loss of autonomy at the local level.
24 Local governments generally support federal legislation allowing states and localities to collect taxes on remote sales, but prior bills have been perceived as harmful by the local governments. For example, the Agreement requires local governments to simplify telecommunication taxes, a major source of revenue for local governments. The SSUTA also requires state-level administration and uniform sourcing rules, which require destination sourcing. The destination-sourcing rules result in winners and losers.
There is much work still needed as the SSTP continues to address thorny issues; however, the SSTP is a move in the right direction. The SSTP is a good example of how states and the federal government might be able to come together to improve the sales tax system while maintaining the essential autonomy states require. The SSUTA forced states to accept common defi nitions of broad categories of tangible products but still allowed them the option to include or exclude each category from the sales tax base as well as fl exibility on the rate of tax. Essentially, the participating states agree on where and how to disagree. The federal government's role is to require consistent sales/use tax treatment of all retail sales when such treatment is administratively feasible.
Business Nexus Standards
Businesses have become more adept in recent years at planning strategies that take advantage of currently accepted 21 For example, see S.1736, S.2152 S.2153, and H.R. 3184. 22 Both businesses and individuals are required to collect use taxes. For all practical purposes, however, the use tax is not enforced on individuals except for items, such as an automobile, that must be registered with the state. Businesses are frequently the target of use tax audits, however. 23 Bruce and Fox (2004) The alternative for states might be a cooperative effort similar in concept to the SSUTA, although on a much smaller scale. The goal would be simplifi ed, bright-line standards that broadly satisfy state demands to assert nexus on businesses with a substantial economic presence, but standards that are not as encompassing as the most aggressive state positions. Developing such standards would give Congress a reasonable alternative that satisfi es the businesses' desire for a workable and fair nexus standard, but also preserves the states' authority to levy tax on businesses from a state's public infrastructure.
A similar policy framework for other income tax issues may also be needed to bring about substantial further improvements in the cooperative relationships between the federal and state governments and a more effi cient system. There is a current disagreement on several broad issues including nexus, defi nition of the taxpayer (e.g., required combined or separate reporting), and apportionment, as well as on important issues of the tax base (e.g., depreciation). As is the case with the SSUTA, states would be free to assert their autonomy, but the divergences would be along agreed upon lines. The current situation has lawmakers in the federal government and the states operating independently, with only a passing thought given to the other taxing jurisdictions. The result is a system that broadly taxes income, but in as many different ways as there are taxing jurisdictions. These differences may prohibit many desirable cooperative efforts (e.g., joint audits).
Multistate Tax Commission Initiatives
The Multistate Tax Commission (MTC) is a voluntary intergovernmental state tax agency that has been working since its inception in 1967 to preserve "the authority of states to determine their own tax policy within the limits of the U.S. Constitution" and to "administer, equitably and effi ciently, tax laws that apply to multistate and multinational enterprises."
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The MTC currently has fi ve new proposed model statutes and six uniformity projects that help promote uniformity or compatibility in signifi cant components of state tax systems. For example, the MTC offers extensive assistance to both states and taxpayers on nexus matters, both by serving as a convenient source of information to taxpayers with nexus questions and by providing a clearinghouse of sorts to resolve nexus issues.
The MTC also operates directly on behalf of states through the Joint Audit Program. States select corporate audit targets, generally a multistate business, and MTC staff performs the actual audit and forwards the audit results to the states, which can act on the results as they see fi t. The program functions as a joint audit by several states, relieving the separate states of the need for several duplicative audits of the same taxpayers. Furthermore, taxpayers must only deal with a single comprehensive evaluation rather than the uncertainty of dealing with audit staff from several states.
Tax Shelter Penalty Statutes
The recent battles by governments at all levels against abusive tax shelters provide good examples of effective intergovernmental cooperation. The federal government led the way by identifying and publishing specifi c abusive transactions and subjecting those transactions to additional penalties. They also imposed new penalties, which were adopted by many of the states. States and the IRS then worked together to identify the participating taxpayers and promoters and then quickly shared the information with all interested parties. The coordination also extended to training and education, and included sharing audit results across governments. The undisputed result was that the combined efforts were much more successful than they would have been had the parties attempted to tackle abusive tax shelters on their own.
Another tool used effectively by the federal government and states to combat tax shelter abuses are voluntary compliance initiatives (VCI), or amnesty programs. The IRS has offered several targeted amnesty programs to resolve specific abusive transactions. 27 Several states have offered their own amnesty programs that covered a much wider variety of transactions. These early efforts benefi ted greatly from federal efforts, particularly the IRS' success in identifying and publishing the details for abusive "listed" and other "reportable" transactions. However, these early state programs differed on who could participate, the transactions covered, the length of the program, the opportunity to fi le for refunds, and other important program elements. 28 In May 2007, the MTC announced a coordinated amnesty program in which 21 states participated. Although the success of the program is currently unknown, the MTC effort is a great example of intergovernmental cooperation. Taxpayers benefi t from having a single set of rules and a chance to "come clean" with many states with a single fi ling. The participating states are also winners as they can use the publicity of such a large program to reach affected taxpayers, and the MTC administers and coordinates the program. Furthermore, the large number of states involved in actively sharing information on taxpayers and promoters should increase the participation rates of taxpayers choosing to voluntarily come forward. While states had to agree on many of the specifics of the program, each could specify the extent of the penalty relief offered to taxpayers, an important variable to lawmakers.
CONCLUSION
Technology advances and the advent of electronic filing make information transfers effi cient and accurate, and governments at all levels are sharing routine information of all kinds. The proliferation of aggressive tax avoidance schemes threatened the viability and integrity of the income tax system, and the states and federal government came together 27 For example, the IRS "Son of Boss" initiative ran from May 5, 2004 through June 21, 2004 and offered reduced penalties to taxpayers that voluntarily came forward and disclosed their participation in the tax planning scheme. 28 See Luna, Brown, Mantzke, Tower, and Wright (2006) for a detailed discussion of the differences between these amnesty programs.
to jointly fi ght that threat. Similarly, the growth of electronic commerce threatens sales tax revenues across states. States are willing to yield some autonomy regarding the base and local rates to preserve the fairness and viability of the sales and use tax. It is not yet a guarantee that the federal government will step in to require sales/use tax collection from remote vendors, but even without federal action, large retailers seem to be willing to cooperate when their compliance burden is made manageable. The keys to future cooperative efforts can be seen with the successful current efforts. Taxing authorities have been able to identify areas of common interest where the loss of autonomy is outweighed by protecting the overall revenue source.
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Going forward, states and the federal government should continue to search for areas where harmonization can occur without sacrificing each government's autonomy and the essential elements necessary to achieve tax policy goals. Reaching agreement on how to treat these items can improve the overall tax system without jeopardizing the benefi ts of subnational taxing autonomy.
